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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT-DEFENDANT THOMAS GROHMANN 
In responding to the opening Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant Grohmann 
("Grohmann"), the Respondent's Brief ("Resp. Br.") of Appellee-Plaintiff Ron Markin 
("Markin") ignores fundamental principles of constitutional law, mischaracterizes or 
disregards applicable precedent, and erects and knocks down straw men that play no role 
in Grohmann's arguments. The fatal flaws in Markin's arguments and attempts at 
misdirection are addressed in detail below. 
1. THE SUPREMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATES 
Much of Markin's Brief is taken up with a discussion of the provisions of the 
Idaho Uniform Foreign Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, IC § 10-1401 
("UFCMJR"), and the Official Comments appended thereto. Regardless of whether 
Markin's characterizations ofthe UFCMJR are accurate (a debatable proposition, at 
best), however, they ignore the most fundamental point of this appeal and the 
constitutional principles upon which it rests. 
To the extent that application of the UFCMJR collides with the mandates of the 
United States Constitution, the Idaho courts are duty-bound by the Supremacy Clause, 
Article VI, Clause 2, to ensure that the UFCMJR yields to the applicable requirements of 
the Constitution. "The States cannot, in the exercise of control over local laws and 
practice, vest State courts with power to violate the supreme law of the land." Kalb v. 
Feuerstein, 306 U.S. 433, 439 (1940) (footnote omitted); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386,39] 
(1947) (" ... the Constitution and the laws passed pursuant to it are the supreme laws of 
the land, binding alike upon states, courts, and the people, 'anything in the Constitution 
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or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. "'). Indeed, as the Supreme Court 
in Testa pointed out, "the fundamental issues over the extent of federal supremacy had 
been resolved by war," making this constitutional principle one that is not only 
fundamental but also one that in the most literal sense, was purchased with the blood of 
many. It can be argued that, for that reason alone, it is a principle entitled to special 
reverence. 
Markin's brief contains no acknowledgement of this principle, however, choosing 
instead to dismiss two other fundamental American legal principles - res judicata and full 
faith and credit - as "domestic principles of law, designed for unifonl1 application of law 
and resolution of disputes with a system of government." Resp. Br. at 5 (citation 
omitted). Although it is not entirely clear, it appears that Markin is suggesting that, 
while constitutional concepts such as supremacy and full faith and credit may be all well 
and good for purely "domestic" matters, foreign country judgments should be seen to 
enjoy a complete exemption from such technicalities when they are brought to our shores 
for enforcement. This is not, however, how our legal system works - even where the 
judgments of foreign countries are concerned - and it reflects a shockingly cavalier 
conception of the place of the courts of Idaho and the other States in our federal system 
and the fealty O\~led by them to the United States Constitution. 
Markin's apparently complete lack of appreciation for the duty of state courts to 
recognize the supremacy of constitutional mandates over conflicting state laws is never 
so clear as in his single-sentence dismissal of the United States Supreme Court's decision 
in Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222 (1998), which he characterizes as no 
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more than "a domestic case not involving a foreign country judgment, [that] is soley [sic] 
concerned with the traditional full faith and credit and res judicata issues inherent in 
domestic litigation within the United States." Resp. Br. at 6. The Baker decision, 
however, establishes two propositions, both of which are critical to this Court's proper 
resolution of the issues before it on this appeal and require reversal of the decision of the 
court below. 
The first of these propositions is that the courts in this country are constitutionally 
required by the Full Faith and Credit clause to recognize the decisions of the courts of 
sister States, and "[f]or claim and issue preclusion (res judicata) purposes ... the 
judgment of the rendering State gains nationwide force." 522 U.S. at 233 (citations 
omitted). The second key point established by Baker is that "[ e ]nforcement measures do 
not travel with the sister state judgment as preclusive effects do." ld. at 235. This Baker 
established, leaves to the "'local law of the forum [the determination as to] the methods 
by which a judgment of another state is enforced. '" Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws § 99 (1969»). 
Markin's attempt to characterize Baker as having implications for "domestic 
litigation" only leads nowhere in terms of that decision's applicability to this case for at 
least two elementary reasons. First, one scours the Baker decision in vain for any hint of 
a suggestion that actions seeking recognition of the judgments of foreign countries are 
somehow exempt from the principles articulated in it. Second, and arguably more 
fundamentally, Markin's contention that it is applicable only to "domestic litigation" 
overlooks the fact that both this case and Markin's action in California that led to the 
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California Judgment cannot be characterized as anything other than "domestic litigation." 
The fact that Markin seeks in this case a ruling recognizing a judgment issued by a 
German court does not make this litigation any less "domestic" than was the California 
action. And the unavoidable problem is that a "domestic" judgment of an Idaho court 
recognizing the German Judgment simply cannot be reconciled with the obligation of the 
Idaho courts to accord full faith and credit to the California JUdgment, including its claim 
preclusion/res judicata effects, as Baker plainly requires. 
II. THERE IS AN UNDENIABLE CONFLICT 
BETWEEN THE CALIFORNIA JUDGMENT 
AND THE GERMAN JUDGMENT. 
Markin next attempts to avoid the clear conflict between the District Court's 
granting recognition to the German Judgment and the California Judgment by baldly 
denying that it even exists. Resp. Br. at 7. Saying there is no conflict, however, does not 
make it so. Markin does not deny that the California Judgment has res judicata effects, or 
even that the Idaho courts are obligated by the Full Faith and Credit Clause to honor 
those effects. Presumably, he would concede, as he must, that if he were to bring in 
Idaho precisely the same claim as the one on which he was able to get the Kammergericht 
to grant the German Judgment, the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Supreme Court's 
Baker decision would compel its summary dismissal. 
By enshrouding that claim in a judgment issued by a Gennan court, however, 
Markin appears to think he has wrapped it in Harry Potter's "invisibility cloak"] and, 
See lK. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE SORCERER'S STONE at 201 
(American ed. 1998) (invisibility cloak introduced). 
7 
having made the claim invisible, he has eliminated any conflict between it and the 
California Judgment. Whatever efficacy that approach might have at Hogwarts School of 
Witchcraft: and Wizardry,2 it has none here. 
But Markin asserts that there is no conflict between the German Judgment and the 
California Judgment because "the German court awarded essentially the same result as 
the forn1er California case .... " Resp. Br. at 7 (emphasis added). Precisely the same 
could be said, however, about a claim filed directly in the Idaho courts based on the 
agreement underlying the California Judgment. If Markin's "essentially the same result" 
argument were adopted by the courts, it would effectively wipe out the entire claim 
preclusion prong of res judicata jurisprudence. "Under the doctrine of res judicata, a 
judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a second suit involving the same parties or 
their privies based on the same cause of action." Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 
U.S. 322, 326 n. 5 (1979). 
After having obtained the California Judgment if Markin had brought a second 
action based on the agreement on which that judgment was based and obtained a 
judgment in, say, an i\rizona court, would the fact that the California Judgment and the 
later judgment from the Arizona court embodied "essentially the same result" mean that 
it was not in conflict with the California Judgment? Of course not. It is patently absurd 
to suggest that the German Judgment is any less in conflict with the California Judgment 
than an Arizona "essentially the same results" judgment would be. Yet, in this action, 
2 See id. at 51-60 CHarry Potter receives his invitation to attend Hogwarts, and 
certain aspects of the nature of the institution are described by the character Hagrid.). 
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Markin sought and obtained from the District Court an order converting the Gennan 
Judgment, for all practical purposes, into an Idaho Judgment. See I.C. § 10-1407. In 
asking the Idaho courts to adopt the Gennan Judgment as their own, Markin has asked 
them to issue a judgment in conflict with the California Judgment's claim preclusion 
effects. This, the Baker decision makes clear, the Full Faith and Credit Clause will not 
countenance, regardless of whether the results are "essentially the same" or not. 
III. MARKIN'S CONTENTION THAT 
G&R PETROLEUM, INC. v. CLEMENTS 
SUPPORTS RECOGNITION OF HIS 
GERMAN JUDGMENT WILL NOT 
WITHSTAND SCRUTINY. 
Markin's attempt to construe the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in G&R 
Petroleum, Inc. v. Clements, 127 Idaho 119, 898 P.2d 50 (1995), to support his 
contentions is both disingenuous and unavailing. Pointing to footnote 4 in that decision, 
he argues that the court in G&R Petroleum "reasoned that an action on a judgment is a 
new and separate action on the debt represented by a prior judgment," and "pursuit can 
still be had in California on [the California Judgment], in which case the Idaho comis 
would be required to recognize the [resulting] new judgment." Resp. Br. at 8 (emphasis 
in original). His action in the German courts, Markin contends, was nothing more than "a 
new action based on the debt represented by the California judgment" and, given this, 
Markin continues, "[i]t does not at all offend res judicata or full faith and credit concepts 
to allow the pursuit ofthe debt represented by the California judgment in Germany." Jd. 
The density of the problems per word in this argument is nothing short of astounding. 
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To begin with, it must be observed that the entire argument is premised on a 
portion of the G&R Petroleum decision that is clearly obiter dictum. The Oregon 
judgment sought to be enforced in that case had been renewed pursuant to an Oregon 
statute prescribing the procedure for renewal of judgments, and was therefore not a 
"new" judgment obtained as a result of an action on the original judgment. See G&R 
Petroleum, 217 Idaho at 120, 123 n. 4, 898 P.2d at 51, 53 n. 4. Indeed, the Idaho 
Supreme Court was at pains, in its brief discussion of the effect of a judgment obtained in 
an action on the original judgment, to make clear that it was only speaking 
hypothetically: " ... had G&R brought a new action on the original Oregon judgment in 
Oregon, instead of simply renewing the original judgment, we would be faced with a 
different case." 217 Idaho at 123 n. 4, 898 P.2d at 53, n.4. 
Apart from the non-binding effect of that portion of the G& R Petroleum decision, 
however, Markin's representation that the Idaho Supreme Court had "reasoned that an 
action on a judgment is a new and separate action on the debt represented by a prior 
judgment," Resp. Br. at 8, is highly misleading. G& R Petroleum was concerned with an 
action seeking enforcement in Idaho of an Oregon judgment, obtained in accordance with 
Oregon law. Crucial to the court's conclusion that a renewed Oregon judgment is 
"merely an extension of the original" was its observation that "Oregon courts have held 
that a 'renewed judgment .... is not the product of a nev-." action but is simply an 
extension of the original proceeding.'" 2] 7 Idaho at 121, 898 P.2d at 52 (quoting 
Shepard & Morse Lumber Co. v. Clawson, 259 Or. 154,486 P.2d 542, 544-45 (1971).). 
From this, it is apparent that the G& R Petroleum court simply inferred that, under 
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Oregon law, "[a In action on a judgment is a new and separate action on the debt 
represented by a prior judgment. " G& R Petroleum, 217 Idaho at 123 n. 4,898 P.2d at 
53, n.4. But here we are concemed with neither an Oregon judgment nor Oregon law. 
The California Judgment was issued pursuant to the laws of California by a 
California federal district court. Under Califomia law, the statutory procedure for 
renewing a judgment before the period for enforcing it expires, and an action on the 
judgment, are but alternative '''method[ s] to extend the life of a judgment. ", Iliff v. 
Dustrud, 107 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1207, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 848, 853 (2003) (quoting Fidelity 
Creditor Service, Inc. v. Browne, 89 CalApp.4th 195,201,106 CalRptr.2d 854 (2001).). 
Both procedures in California, therefore, involve "a revival that is merely an extension of 
the original judgment in the rendering state," which the G&R Petroleum court held to be 
subject to Idaho's six-year statute of limitations on the enforcement of judgments, IC § 5-
215. Thus, whether a Califomia judgment is renewed pursuant to the statutorily 
prescribed procedure for renewal, or extended by an action on the judgment resulting in a 
secondary judgment, any Idaho action seeking enforcement of either the original 
judgment, or a secondary judgment extending it, is baned if not brought within six years 
of the filing of the original judgment. 3 
3 This analysis is fully bome out by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 
and its accompanying commentary: 
If ... the intervening time between the revival of the judgment [in the State 
where the judgment was originally rendered] and the commencement of 
suit in the sister State does not exceed the sister State's statutory period [for 
enforcing judgments l but this period is exceeded by the time that has 
elapsed since the rendition of the original judgment, the nature of the 
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Even more to the point, however, is the basic fact that the Gennan Judgment is not 
a judgment resulting from an action on the California Judgment brought in California and 
decided under California law. It is instead the judgment of a German court on a claim 
pointedly not based on the California Judgment that blatantly misapplies not Gennan, but 
California law. As such, it clearly is not analogous to the hypothetical situation 
mentioned briefly by the court in footnote 4 of the G&R Petroleum decision. 
Finally, Markin's statement that ,"[iJt does not at all offend res judicata or full 
faith and credit concepts to allow the pursuit of the debt represented by the California 
judgment in Germany," Resp. Br. at 8, is nothing but classic misdirection. The question 
before this Court, of course, is not whether Markin's "pursuit of the debt represented by 
the California judgment in Gennany" offended res judicata, full faith and credit, or any 
other American legal concept. The question is whether, having obtained a judgment from 
a Gennan court that indisputably does not honor the res judicata effects of the California 
Judgment, Markin can now induce the Idaho courts to grant recognition to the German 
Judgment, without also inducing them to violate their constitutional duty to accord the res 
judicata effects of the California Judgment full faith and credit. The answer is clear that 
he cannot. and the decision of the District Court must be reversed. 
revival becomes material. If under the local law of the State of rendition 
the effect of this revival is to create a new judgment, then suit on this 
judgment may not be held barred under full faith and credit in the sister 
State. The contrarY will be true, however. if the effect of the revival in the 
~ . . 
State of rendition is not to create a new judgment but rather to prolong the 
effective life ofthe original judgment. 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 118, Comment (c) (1971). 
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IV. THE GERMAN JUDGMENT AND THE CLAIM ON WHICH IT 
IS BASED ARE REPUGNANT TO U.S. PUBLIC POLICY 
PRECLUDING RECOGNITION BY THE IDAHO COURTS. 
Markin points out, correctly, that repugnancy to public policy is a discretionary 
ground for refusing recognition to foreign country judgments in Idaho's version of the 
UFCMJRA. Resp. Br. at 8; IC § 10-1404(3)(c). He also asserts, based on the Official 
Comment to IC § 10-1404, that: "For purposes of the statute, which was duly enacted by 
the State of Idaho, public policy is violated only if enforcement would tend clearly to 
injure the public health, morals, or the public confidence in the administration of justice, 
or would undermine the sense of security of individual rights or property that any citizen 
out to feel." Resp. Br. at 9. It is, at a very minimum, arguable that recognition and the 
Idaho courts of the Gennan Judgment in the circumstances of this case would indeed 
have an adverse effect on "public confidence in the administration of justice" and 
"undermine the sense of security of individual rights or property that any citizen ought to 
feel." 
It must be remembered that this is a conflict arising out of an agreement entered 
into by two U.S. citizens on American soil, setting forth obligations to be performed in 
this country, and governed by agreement by the law of California, that ultimately led to 
the issuance of a judgment by the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
California. I f. .. under these circumstances. the German Judgment were now recognized in 
~ '--' c..-
Idaho, it would effectively signal the end of res judicata effects attaching to the 
judgments of federal or State courts in the United States whenever one of the litigants can 
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concoct a reason to sue the other in a foreign land. If this is how the UFCMJRA is to be 
applied, there is very good reason for erosion of public confidence in our legal system, 
and for any sense of security of individual rights - at least those secured by the judgments 
of courts in this country - to be undermined. 
Moreover, Markin's characterization of repugnancy to public policy as a 
discretionary basis for denying recognition to a foreign country judgment is, in the 
circumstances of this case, altogether too facile. True, the UFCMJRA itself does place 
repugnancy to public policy in the discretionary category. As discussed above, however, 
state statutes must yield when they conflict with constitutional mandates such as the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause. But it also seems that the authors of the Official Comments to 
I C 10-1401, on which Markin places much reliance, were themselves fully cognizant of 
the fact that refusing recognition of a foreign judgment on repugnancy to public policy 
grounds could, in some circumstances, be mandatory, depending on the public policy the 
foreign judgment would offend. 
The very discussion in Comment 8 that Markin cites contains a citation to the case 
of Badman v. India Abroad Publication, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 154 Misc.2d 228 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1992). As the Comment notes, that was a case in which a judgment creditor 
sought to have a British libel judgment recognized despite the fact that it was inconsistent 
with the First Amendment's guaranties of free speech. The court in Bachnan specifically 
addressed the question of whether, when the public policy to which a foreign judgment is 
repugnant is one expressed in the Constitution, the discretionary standard of the statute is 
transmuted into a mandatory one. 
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Similarly, if, as claimed by defendant, the public policy to which the 
foreign judgment is repugnant is embodied in the First Amendment 
to the United States Constitution or the free speech guaranty of the 
Constitution of this State, the refusal to recognize the judgment 
should be, and it is deemed to be, "constitutionally mandatory." 
585 N.Y.S.2d at 662,154 Misc.2d at 231(emphasis added). 
Because the District Court's decision to recognize the German Judgment in this 
case runs afoul of the Idaho courts' constitutional duty to accord full faith and credit to 
the California Judgment, it cannot stand. The German Judgment is inimical to the public 
policy embodied in the Full Faith and Credit Claus, as well as the public policies of both 
California and Idaho reflected in their adherence to the doctrine of res judicata and its 
claim preclusive effects. As the Badman cOUli held, denial of recognition to foreign 
judgments repugnant to constituti onal provisions is "constitutionally mandated." 
CONCLUSION 
Markin's arguments have failed utterly to provide this Court with a valid basis for 
affirming the judgment below and sustaining the recognition of the German Judgment. 
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above and in Grohmann's opening Brief, this Court 
must overrule the District Court's decision, hold that the Idaho courts are precluded from 
granting recognition to the German Judgment in the circumstances of this case, and 
remand this matter to the District Court for dismissal of Markin's Complaint. Because of 
this, Grohmann is also entitled to an award of attorney's fees for the reasons discussed in 
. 
Grohmann's opening Brief to this Court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 21 sl day of October, 2011. 
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Richard K. Walker. Esquire 
Walker & Peskind. PLLC 
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